1 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK Case No. 09-50026 In the Matter of: MOTORS LIQUIDATION COMPANY ET AL., f/k/a GENERAL MOTORS CORP., ET AL. Debtors. United States Bankruptcy Court One Bowling Green New York, New York September 14, 2009 9:02 AM B E F O R E: HON. ROBERT E. GERBER U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

2 1 2 HEARING re Continuing Objections to the Order Authorizing the 3 Sale of Assets Pursuant to the Amended and Restated Master Sale 4 and Purchase Agreement with NGMCO, Inc. 5 Motion of ACE American Insurance Company and Affiliated 6 7 Companies to Compel Debtors to Assume or Reject Insurance Policies and Related Agreements. 8 9 HEARING re Debtors' Motion for Order Pursuant to Section 10 11 502(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3) Establishing the Deadline for Filing Proofs of Claim Including 12 Claims Under Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code and 13 Procedures Relating Thereto and Approving the Form and Manner 14 of Notice Thereof. 15 16 HEARING re Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 17 U.S.C Sections 327 (a) and 330 Authorizing the Debtors to Amend 18 19 the Terms of Their Engagement with Brownfield Partners, LLC. 2.0 2.1 HEARING re Debtors' Sixth Omnibus Motion Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 365 to Reject Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired 22 23 Leases of Nonresidential Real Property. 24 25

HEARING re Motion of Debtors for Order Pursuant to Section 365(d)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code Extending Time to Assume or Reject Unexpired Leases of Nonresidential Real Property. HEARING re Motion of Debtors for Entry of Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 1121(d) Extending Exclusive Periods in Which Debtors May File Chapter 11 Plan and Solicit Acceptances Thereof. HEARING re Verified Motion of Environmental Testing Corporation (ETC) for Payment of Administrative Expenses - Stip to be Submitted. Transcribed by: Penina Wolicki

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PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Okay, GM. Good morning, Mr. Smolinsky, Mr. Karotkin.

MR. SMOLINSKY: Good morning, sir. Good morning, Your Honor. Joe Smolinsky of Weil, Gotshal & Manges for the debtors. I think we have a fairly short calendar today. I think things will move quickly.

I'll just jump into the first matter we have on the agenda this morning, which is a status conference on cure objections with respect to the sale that closed on July 10th.

If I may, Your Honor, I'd like to hand up a one-page chart.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Smolinsky, I want to interrupt you for a second. I meant to deal with this at the very outset. I have an attorney intern with me who is going to be working in my chambers until she begins with the Weil firm in approximately January. We're going to be entering a formal order in this case and in other cases in which Weil is involved. She's going to be recusing herself from all matters involving this GM case and in the other Weil-related cases. So I just wanted to note that on the record. Her name is Candace Arthur. You'll see her on your left.

MR. SMOLINSKY: Thank you, Your Honor. This chart shows a comparison of where we stood on August 2nd, which is the last time we were before you on a cure status conference, and as of September 12th. And you'll see that with respect to

7 remaining cure objections before this Court, on August 2nd we 1 2 had 179 pending counterparties that had pending objections. 3 Today we have 46. At the bottom, if we pull out those that we 4 have agreements with that are simply awaiting formal documentation, we're down to 27 counterparties. 5 Your Honor, we'd like to fix another date for a status 6 conference in the second half of October. By that time, I 7 think we'll have a very good understanding of what, if any, 8 cure objections we would have to start thinking about 9 scheduling for Court intervention. But I don't believe that 10 11 we're going to have many at all. THE COURT: Sure. That makes total sense. Just work 12 out a mutually satisfactory date with Ms. Blum and make it 13 happen. 14 MR. SMOLINSKY: Thank you. Your Honor, there's a 15 16 matter with ACE Insurance. I don't know if it's on your calendar. There was a withdrawal that was filed, I think 17 Thursday or Friday of last week. It's a motion to compel 18 19 assumption and assignment or rejection. I don't know if you 2.0 have it on your calendar --21 THE COURT: I do have it on my calendar, but it's been withdrawn? 22 MR. SMOLINSKY: Well, Your Honor, I wanted to give, 23 just as a housekeeping matter, an update. We had noticed ACE 24

Insurance contracts, which are insurance policies, for

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8 assumption and assignment in connection with the regular 1 2 procedures. ACE filed an objection to that notice. We had 3 been in the process of working things out. They ultimately 4 filed a motion to compel assumption or rejection. THE COURT: Wait. I lost you. I thought I heard you 5 say half a second ago that you had volunteered to assume and 6 7 assign it, and they still wanted you to --MR. SMOLINSKY: Yes, Your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: -- assume and assign it? 10 MR. SMOLINSKY: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Or make a decision? 11 12 MR. SMOLINSKY: They --13 THE COURT: What am I missing? MR. SMOLINSKY: -- they weren't happy with the level 14 of information that we provided them with this notice. 15 16 are insurance policies. There are hundreds of policies. There are very complicated issues with respect to how those contracts 17 would be assumed and assigned. And ultimately, they wanted us 18 to enter into an assumption and assignment agreement that would 19 2.0 set out the respective responsibilities of the parties in 21 greater detail than simply the sale order. Your Honor, the debtors are selling insurance 22 policies, but at the same time, they're reserving their rights 23 to assert claims that they would have under the policies, as an 24

additional insured. And as the debtors, we wanted to make sure

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that we continued to have the ability to assert claims under the policy, even though ownership of the policy had been transferred to the purchaser. And in fact, the purchaser was intending ACE to continue to provide coverage for their operations on a post-sale basis. So it was a complicated transaction.

THE COURT: Right. But I assume that you and the purchaser want to reserve the right to do whatever you want, and you're willing to give ACE an opportunity to be heard if it thinks that either you or the new purchaser are acting inappropriately.

MR. SMOLINSKY: That's right, Your Honor. And ACE wanted to make sure that if there are obligations on the part of the debtors for asserting claims, that we would be responsible for our obligations under the policy with respect to those claims.

THE COURT: Um-hum.

MR. SMOLINSKY: So we did ultimately reach agreement on an assumption and assignment agreement. That is why the matter was withdrawn and taken off calendar. In discussions with the committee on Friday, they asked for additional time to understand the interrelationships between the purchaser and the debtors on these policies. We've agreed to adjourn the ACE matters to -- basically restore it to the calendar.

It wasn't fair on ACE's part. They withdrew the

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motion based on the expectation that the agreement would be handed up to Your Honor today. And since it's not, we are willing to restore it to the calendar. I think we put on our agenda an October 6 date. But this is an important matter for the purchaser. They are currently operating, perhaps, without full insurance benefits. So what I propose, Your Honor, is that we put it on -- restore it back on the calendar for September 30th, and in the meantime we are preparing a presentation for the committee. And to the extent that we get the committee's consent, we would just submit it to Your Honor for signature. That would resolve the cure objection and would also result, again, in the withdrawal of the motion to compel. THE COURT: Sure. Either counsel for ACE or the committee, Mr. Rogoff, want to be heard on this? MR. ROGOFF: Good morning, Your Honor. Adam Rogoff, Kramer Levin, on behalf of the creditors' committee. going to work with the debtor to try to get an understanding of the different contracts that are being assumed and assigned. As counsel for the debtors indicated, this is not simply a

matter of assuming and assigning an agreement over to a purchaser outright, relieving the estate of potential liability, but that there could be claims that the agreement contemplated would be asserted against the estate on an administrative basis --

THE COURT: And you don't want to give up the right to

get the benefits of that if there are rights to be had? 1 2 MR. ROGOFF: Well, we just simply want to make sure we 3 understand, first, that the estate remains protected under 4 insurance policies as a matter of the agreement or applicable law, but also, more importantly, that we just have an 5 understanding of what the potential costs could be to the 6 7 estate on a go-forward basis. We will work with the debtors diligently to understand 8 the agreements, and we do hope that the agreements will allow 9 10 for handing up a consensual order. 11 THE COURT: Fair enough. Okay. Makes total sense, Mr. Smolinsky. So just make it happen. 12 MR. SMOLINSKY: Thank you, Your Honor. At this point, 13 there's one more contested matter, the bar date, and I would 14 like to cede the podium to Mr. Karotkin. 15 16 THE COURT: Sure. Okay. Is somebody here from Mr. Esserman's firm? 17 MR. D'APICE: Good morning, Your Honor. Peter D'Apice 18 from Mr. Esserman's firm. 19 2.0 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Karotkin, I'll let you speak in a moment. But I read the papers here. Unless you, Mr. 2.1 D'Apice, can get me -- bring me something to my attention that 22 isn't in your papers, I'm not of a mind to provide for any 23 special noticing for asbestos claims. I think that would be 24

wholly inappropriate. So it seems to me, the principal issue

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that I need to deal with is, is a forty-five days right or would I be better served providing for maybe sixty days on the amount of time. But I also need to know whether that would have a material adverse effect upon the debtors or the creditors who are involved.

I agreed with the point that the notice was kind of verbose and legalese. But since so many claims were scheduled, I don't know if that's a big deal. I noticed a lack of an objection by the creditors' committee. Let me hear if there is any reason why treating asbestos claimants any differently than other creditors in this case, most obviously tort claimants, is warranted. This is not an asbestos-driven case.

Mr. Karotkin, I'll hear from you first.

MR. KAROTKIN: Your Honor, I really don't have much to add to what is in our papers. Obviously, we certainly agree with what you just said. This is not -- as you have noticed before at the sale hearing, this is not an asbestos case. With respect to the amount of time for the proposed notice, I would note, as we noted in our papers, that the asbestos bar is probably among the most well organized bar in the country, and for them to suggest that they can't get claims filed within that period doesn't make any sense to me at all.

I will note that counsel's papers -- Mr. Esserman's and his colleagues' papers, refer to the Eagle-Picher case as a basis for there not being a bar date in an asbestos-related

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personal injury case. I personally represented Eagle-Picher in its first Chapter 11 case where the first 524(g) injunction was obtained. And I can represent to the Court that in that case there was in fact a bar date for asbestos-related personal injury claims. That was a classic asbestos-related Chapter 11 case. That was the sine qua non for the filing of a Chapter 11. That is not what we have here. And we don't think there's any reason for these claims to be treated differently than a host of other tort claims in these cases.

THE COURT: Let me just ask you the one question that did occur to me when I was reviewing the papers. If I increased it from forty-five days to sixty, would that present you with problems?

MR. KAROTKIN: There is a lot of pressure from the creditors' committee to get distributions out as quickly as possible and propose a plan as quickly as possible. Your Honor, I cannot stand up in front of you and say that fifteen days is going to make a difference.

THE COURT: Um-hum.

MR. KAROTKIN: Mr. Rogoff is --

THE COURT: Maybe I should let Mr. Rogoff comment on it, because he's got to balance the concerns of fair notice to his constituency with getting appropriate -- I'm sure his people, and if I were in his shoes, I would too, want to get their distributions as quickly as possible. But I'm sure he

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doesn't want to leave people locked out. So I'll get his comments. Maybe I should get them now, Mr. Rogoff.

MR. ROGOFF: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm actually going to make this very easy for the Court, I hope. We're not going to object to the extension by the fifteen days. The rationale, I think is, the Court has noted the tension between on the one hand, wanting to get the plan process completed diligently, and as everybody appreciates, the claims analysis is an important part of that; on the other hand, we also need to make sure that there is adequate notice of the bar date given. We do feel that the extra fifteen days of notice certainly helps all creditors in getting their claims in.

The other aspect of it, which will tie into exclusivity requests, Your Honor will note that we did file a response in support. And underlying that response, and of course tying into Your Honor's concern on this motion, is that we hope to be working with the debtors diligently during this extension period to try to formulate and analyze the very complex issues that could exist in the structure of a plan. It is a liquidating plan on the one hand, but we do have a variety of issues that we need to cross with them.

So given the time and the cooperation that we expect to have working with the debtor and its professionals on that process, as long as we're moving diligently on that, which I expect that we will, I don't see any global prejudice, weighing

15 and balancing all the considerations, to the extra fifteen 1 2 days. 3 THE COURT: Well, I assume that both you and the 4 debtors want to get your arms on the universe of claims that are out there, but that nobody's suggesting that they could be 5 liquidated any time soon, and you'd know exactly how much any 6 particular claimant's claim is? 7 MR. ROGOFF: We expect -- as Your Honor notes 8 correctly, the first step is getting the claims in, seeing the 9 universe of the unliquidated claims, and then dealing with a 10 11 host of issues on the claims process that, in turn, tie into 12 the plan formulation. THE COURT: Right. Okay, thank you. 13 MR. ROGOFF: You're welcome. 14 THE COURT: Mr. D'Apice, may I hear you, please? 15 MR. D'APICE: Thank you. Peter D'Apice of Stutzman --16 THE COURT: I'm sorry if I mispronounced your name. 17 MR. D'APICE: -- that's all right, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: D'Apice? 19 MR. D'APICE: D'Apice, of Stutzman --2.0 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 21 MR. D'APICE: -- Bromberg, Esserman & Plifka, on 22 behalf of the ad hoc committee. 23 The first thing I want to do, Your Honor, is just 24 25 quickly clear up the Eagle-Picher cite that we made. And what

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we actually cited Eagle-Picher for in the case was not that there was no bar date set in that case. What we cited it for was two propositions. One is that the Eagle-Picher Court stated that "while such bar dates are commonly set in Chapter 11 cases, upon good cause shown, the Court may dispense with one in a given case." Simply for that principle. And I'll later argue why asbestos claims give the Court the cause it needs to dispense with a bar date.

The other point that we cited Eagle-Picher for was to contrast it with this case. This case has been pending for what, three months. It is an exceptional case, there's no doubt about it. Forty-five days notice, under circumstances which I'll talk about in a minute, is not going to be adequate for the far-flung nationwide pool of claimants that's out there. But we cited Eagle-Picher for the other proposition, that that case had been pending over three years, and more than a hundred days' notice of the bar date was given. So just to compare that. So we did not -- if we confused Mr. Karotkin, I apologize. But we were citing it simply for the propo -- those two propositions.

Let me tell you why asbestos claims should be treated differently from other tort claims, particularly in a case like this. This may not be an asbestos-driven case, and it may not -- and adequately described or fairly described as an asbestos case, but that's kind of a label. What it is, it's a

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case that has indisputably tens of thousands of potential asbestos claimants.

In terms of getting their arms around the scope of the potential exposure, General Motors has done analyses of using the standard econometrician methods that are used in handling -- in analyzing asbestos claims, to forecast its liability, to get a grip on what it's got and to forecast its liability. And that report was used, I believe in connection with the sale motion. It was the Hamilton, Rabinowitz & Associates report prepared in January of 2009. It is a confidential report. Its existence is not confidential. But it is a confidential report.

But needless to say, on the basis of that report, GM reserved hundreds of millions of dollars and is indisputably, given its long operation and its nationwide operation, international operation, is facing tens of thousands of claims.

What do you do with the proofs of claim when you get them? How do you handle those claims? The debtor's going to have to somehow enter that information into a database of some kind. The debtor's then going to have to adjudicate those claims in some way. Those people will have a right, for their personal injury claim, to have that adjudicated according to their due process rights; which means that they're entitled to a jury; it's not going to get adjudicated by this Court; they're entitled to -- if there's a claim objection filed, then

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you start a contested matter. How is this Court possibly going to handle tens of thousands of contested matters, let alone 10,000 contested matters, within any reasonable period of time?

And the reason this is kind of -- it's not sensible -respectfully, Your Honor, it's not sensible, because there's a
well-worn path to handling mass tort claims like this. And it
involves a postconfirmation trust that is set up and has trust
clerks, basically, claims clerks, do what otherwise Your Honor
would have to do in trying to liquidate a claim. Now --

THE COURT: Well, you said that I would liquidate. I don't think anybody would suggest that I would liquidate. I might estimate the claims, but -- which is a traditional bankruptcy judge function. But if they actually have to be liquidated and tried, I've got 157 problems, don't I?

MR. D'APICE: Yes, Your Honor, you do. And I would submit, Your Honor, that you can estimate, and claims have been estimated in other cases with mass tort liabilities. But what we have here, what I understand the debtor and the committee to say, is that this is going to be a liquidating plan. This is not a plan of reorganization of a company that's going to continue operating. This is a liquidating plan. So if any estimation leads to a number that then gets allocated to the asbestos claims, both present and unknown claimants, they're capped at that number, effectively.

THE COURT: Well, isn't that exactly why the debtors

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and the creditors' committee want to get their arms around the universe of claims?

MR. D'APICE: I don't -- I agree that we need to get our arms around the universe of claims, Your Honor. And the way to do that -- the efficient way to do that, and a way that's been done in many other cases, is you have -- they had an econometrician, their expert, look at the database that GM already has in place, its claims history; they look at the allocation of the disease levels within that claims history; they look at factors -- the experts look at factors like propensity to sue for purposes of forecasting future claims that will come down the pipe.

As every day passes, some claimant who, the day before didn't have a claim, manifests and has a claim. As every day passes, there are more claimants coming up. And there are claimants in the future who haven't even been really thought about, or if they've been thought about, they're really getting sort of left in the lurch.

And this is another issue which I don't want to get into today, but Your Honor did suspend order or abate ruling on our earlier motion to appoint an asbestos committee. And I believe you denied the motion for appointment of a futures claims rep. I don't recall if that was done without prejudice.

But in terms of getting our arms around the set, the universe of asbestos claims against this company, proofs of

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claims are kind of -- are an impractical burden. The debtor has to take those claims and enter them in. And ultimately, in order to forecast what the total liability might be, the debtor's best served by looking at its own database that it already has, its database of existing claims, resolved claims, its claims history. You look at the claims history and then you forecast the liability from that.

We've done that in other cases, Your Honor.

Ultimately, that is where, I believe, courts want to end up, because it is the most efficient way -- I'm not saying it's going to happen in three months -- but it is the most efficient way to resolve the tens of thousands of claims. And it would also allow the debtor to not only get its arms around its liability and the creditors' committee to see what that liability is, and weigh in on it in some sort of estimation process that we can work out or that an asbestos committee could work out with the debtor and the creditors' committee, and negotiate some resolution that will give this debtor a trust that will be set up postpetition to handle all asbestos claims against GM.

The other thing I want to point out, Your Honor, is the bar date order that's proposed by debtor forbids anyone who fails to file a proof of claim from suing not only the debtor but any successor. And that brings us back into the whole successor liability issue that was raised in connection with

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the sale. And so what we've got is a class of tort claimants who've been effectively left behind in Old GM, and now --

THE COURT: Isn't that an issue for the circuit or the United States Supreme Court?

MR. D'APICE: It may -- I think they've already spoken on the issue, Your Honor. I think the Second Circuit has --

THE COURT: Well, that's right. So my point is, I'm puzzled by your apparent desire to relitigate that issue when I ruled and at least seemingly properly anticipated what the circuit would say about that issue. Which means that we're now up to either an en banc by the Second Circuit in saying that it didn't mean it, or by the United States Supreme Court in saying that the Second Circuit got it wrong.

MR. D'APICE: I don't wish to relitigate the issue,
Your Honor. All I'm pointing out is that if the goal here is
to get our arms around the universe of asbestos claims and
treat them fairly, there are well-worn paths and well-trod ways
to do that.

THE COURT: No. Forgive me, Mr. D'Apice. Then I don't understand the thrust of your point that you want to get another bite at the apple on an injunction that protects the purchase.

MR. D'APICE: Your Honor, if a 524(g)trust were established, that's a possibility.

THE COURT: No, forgive me. Because I don't know if

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this is just aggressive advocacy or if it's out of line. But I ruled at some length on whether or not there would be injunctive protections against the purchaser on claims that are claims against this estate on successor liability issues. I ruled on the basis of a Second Circuit order which later was followed by a Second Circuit opinion which laid it out at much greater length even than I did, and I've been justifiably criticized for writing an awful lot sometimes, perhaps more than I need to.

So what are you telling me that you want to do about objecting to the injunction that I previously ordered?

MR. D'APICE: Your Honor, I'm not here to object to the injunction that you previously ordered. That was not my intent. My only intent was to describe the methodology that's been used in other cases for handling mass torts, mass asbestos -- numbers of asbestos claims. I wasn't trying to relitigate the injunction or talk about -- or challenge the injunction issue. I was just talking about how to handle asbestos claims in a bankruptcy case. And one way to do it is the 524(g) trust, as Your Honor --

THE COURT: One way to do it is a 524(g) trust. And parties can be heard and discuss with each other as to whether that's necessary or appropriate here. But I don't see how that's an issue for today.

MR. D'APICE: Well, I understand, Your Honor. I'm

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only offering that up as an option, because if such a trust were established, a bar date and proofs of claims would not be necessary and would be a waste of debtor assets, because they wouldn't really look at the proofs of claims.

My only point, Your Honor, is that if you get the proofs of claims and you try to estimate them here in this Court, we've got a liquidating plan. So they will effectively -- and this issue may have to be briefed -- but they would effectively be estimated for liquidation purposes, for distribution purposes. Unless I'm missing something, Your Honor, there's no -- if a claim is estima -- if a tort claimant's claim is estimated and it turns out the estimate is -- it's estimated for purposes of allowance of the claim and for purposes of the plan but not for distribution, if it later turns out that the estimation was too low, I believe the tort claimant has a right to come back and seek to have that remedied. But in this case, I don't see where there would be any ability to come back, because it's a liquidating claim. Unless I'm missing something, Your Honor, I don't see where that's an issue.

So my only point was that yes, estimation is I think an advisable way to go. I think it works. But you don't need proofs of claim for estimation. It adds a layer of bureaucracy in the case that's not only trouble -- a burden on the claimants, but it also ultimately will be a burden on the

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debtor. But that's their choice, and I'm not going to -- if they want to do that, I'm not going to dispute that.

But in terms of the notice that's given, Your Honor, again, I point out, this company's been operating for decades, and it has far-flung operations, and there's claimants in virtually all the states. The debtor's database will reflect where the bulk of those claimants are. Many of them are not -- probably, I don't know this for a fact, but I would assume that many of the claimants, particularly those whose claims are accruing most recently, are not yet represented by counsel.

How are all these people going to be noticed? Is debtor planning to send notices to all of the tens of thousands of claimants that it knows about already in its databases? I don't know the answer to that, Your Honor. I think that would potentially be a very expensive undertaking. Is it planning to advertise in newspapers in the locales, the regions, the states where the bulk of these claimants are? I don't see that they volunteered that, Your Honor.

And in terms of notifying -- publishing notices in the national papers, I think, Your Honor, with respect, I think the bar, it may have pockets of it that are well organized, but there are also many attorneys out there who are not part of any well-organized network, and these things -- for this number of claimants, I would respectfully submit, they need to be heavily noticed and ample time given for claimants to recognize that

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they have claims against Motors Liquidation and any of the other entities that the debtors that survive and have been renamed, and they can pursue those claims.

Your Honor, with all respect, the debtor is, as we all know, a fiduciary to its creditors. It holds a high duty to those creditors. And the notice that should be given under the case law that we've cited and under the Mulane (ph.) Supreme Court case from Judge Jackson, is the kind of notice you would give if you actually wanted people to get the notice. And in order to do that, with the tens of thousands of claimants, we're talking about a tremendous amount -- it seems to me, a tremendous amount of time and effort spent identifying, finding their addresses, if you don't have their addresses, for some reason, and mailing the notice out to them.

THE COURT: Are the people who assert asbestos claims people who worked in factories where brake linings or other car components were crafted, or are there consumers who somehow say that by driving a Chevy you get asbestos exposure?

MR. D'APICE: I don't know about the latter, Your
Honor. I would imagine that the claimants include workers in
manufacturing. I understand also that the claimant class would
include workers who repaired automobiles or who worked on
brakes or other component parts that had asbestos in them,
whether they were repairing them, cutting them, or whatever.

THE COURT: Well, local garages would be all over the

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country. Are you suggesting that some kind of notice has to be crafted that's going to capture every mechanic in every garage across the United States?

MR. D'APICE: No, Your Honor. What I'm suggesting is that if debtor has a database, as we've seen in their papers, a database of existing claimants or known claimants, that those claimants, I think, would need to receive mail notice. And whether or not debtor has all their addresses, I don't know. But I think those people need to receive notice by mail.

The motion, I thought was a little -- you know, the motion says if we've got their addresses we'll use them; if we don't have them, we won't use them. I think the burden on the debtor is a little bit higher than that with respect to its known creditors. I believe it has to find the addresses for those people and mail out the notices.

And then when you do publications in the national papers, if you want to be sure to cover the area and give adequate notice, I think we've also got to include publications like Mealey's. I mean, I'd point out to Your Honor, in debtor's reply, they attached the bar date order from the Quigley case. And this was attached to debtor's reply filed Friday. And in Quigley, not only did -- the order I'm looking at, I didn't see any other orders from Quigley. But the order that I'm looking at carved out asbestos-related personal injury claims from the bar date. It said, "Holders of the following

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claims need not and should not file a proof of claim on or before the general claims bar date." And one of them is "an asbestos-related personal injury claim, other than a claim for contribution, indemnity, reimbursement or subrogation."

And it also included publication notice in the Mealey's litigation report for silica. So I imagine there was silica claims in that case. I'm not sure. I haven't gone back since Friday to look at the Quigley case. But in Quigley, at least, there was at least the asbestos claimants were carved out from or excluded from the general bar date. Whether they had a later bar date, I don't know, they may well have. And that may make sense.

But it's not an unusual thing to either -- to not set a bar date for asbestos claims or to set a later bar date.

It's not unusual, Your Honor, and in purposes of this case, for trying to get these claims resolved, our recommendation would be that no bar date be set and that the claims be resolved using the kind of econometrician analysis that's been done in other cases.

With that, I would respectfully recommend reconsideration. This is not the proper point for that to pursue the reconsideration. But the ad hoc committee's motion for the appointment of an asbestos claimants committee is still pending. Your Honor abated that, abated ruling on that until later in the case. And this may be an appropriate point in the

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28 case for reconsideration of that motion so that we can get a committee in place that can represent the interests of this body of creditors. With a procedure for doing that, I don't know. I'm not prepared to argue it today, but I toss that out there as a thought for Your Honor and as a way to resolve these claims in a sensible way. THE COURT: What is the Nealey's (sic) to which you were making reference? MR. D'APICE: I'm sorry, Your Honor. THE COURT: What is the Nealey's (sic) to which you were making reference? MR. D'APICE: It's a Mealey's publication on asbestos. Mealey's asbestos litigation. THE COURT: It's like a newsletter that goes to asbestos lawyers? MR. D'APICE: Mealey's, it goes out to --THE COURT: Is it Mealey's with an M or Nealey's with an N? MR. D'APICE: I'm sorry. Mealey's with an M as in Michael. It's M-E-A-L-E-Y-S. Mealey's litigation reports. They do it typically for -- or they have a large publication for insurance. They've evidently got one for silica. They

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monthly basis. And it's read by whoever subscribes to it, Your

have one for asbestos. And they publish, I believe it's a

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Honor. But I think at least in the asbestos industry, it's a good source for keeping people apprised of what's happening in the asbestos world.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Anybody want to be heard for a first time before I give people a second chance to be heard?

Okay. Mr. Karotkin, do you want to reply?

MR. KAROTKIN: Thank you, Your Honor. Stephen

Karotkin, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, for the debtors.

First of all, let me assure Mr. D'Apice, I wasn't confused by his citation to the Eagle-Picher case at all, but I thank him for his clarification.

I think, Your Honor, you put your finger on it when you distinguished between the claims filing process and the claims adjudication process and the claims estimation process, and recognized that in many cases where there are asbestos-related claims, the Court certainly has the authority to estimate the claims for the purposes of plan confirmation. And certainly the debtors need to know the universe of claims, together with the creditors' committee, to get to the plan formulation process. And I'm sure that Mr. D'Apice will recognize that in connection -- although this is not an asbestos case, and I'm not suggesting that it is -- in connection with the estimation of any asbestos-related liability, the starting point is the universe of present

claims. We don't have that yet.

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We have lawsuits that have been filed. And we will certainly -- let me make it perfectly clear, notice of the bar date will be given to the attorneys of record in all of those lawsuits that have been commenced. And there may be other claims out there.

THE COURT: I assume that the great bulk of the people asserting asbestos claims do it through lawyers. But I assume if any individual contacted the company and says I think I have an asbestos claim, you would be mailing notice to --

MR. KAROTKIN: Absolutely.

THE COURT: -- any such person?

MR. KAROTKIN: Absolutely, sir. To the extent that publication is inadequate, I find it kind of funny that Mr. D'Apice says we ought to publish in Mealey's. Mealey's is for asbestos lawyers, the plaintiffs' lawyers. And if he is purporting to stand up before this Court and say the asbestos lawyers in the United States do not know that General Motors is in Chapter 11, I would find that absolutely astonishing, absolutely astonishing. They know what's going on. He is certainly in contact with them. He knows what's going on. He's been before this Court.

I think that what he's trying to do is revisit a number of issues, and I think you called him on that. Look, this case is no different than any other case. This is not an

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asbestos case. There are asbestos claims out there. They will be get appropriate notice. The notice that we're providing is well-designed to reach potential claimants out there. It is being widely published. It's being published in USA Today. Your Honor, we think the notice is more than adequate.

We are not trying to bind future claimants, obviously, as Your Honor alluded to, those issues have been addressed by Your Honor as well as the Second Circuit. No one is requesting or requiring that future claimants file claims because they can't file claims. And they certainly are not going to be, nor will we take the position that pure future claimants are barred by any proposed order you enter in connection with the bar date.

But again, we are prepared to move forward. We think there's adequate notice. If Your Honor has suggested and would like us to give an additional fifteen days notice, I think we all are amenable to that.

I would just like to point out one or two other things that are more in the nature of housekeeping, if I may. First of all, if you change the date, it really doesn't matter. But it turned out that, I believe, November 9th was a Sunday so we had to change it to November 10th. We've also added, at the request of the committee, a list at the end of the proposed notice that lists the bond indentures and the QSIP numbers, so people who have bond claims will be able to recognize that to

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the extent they purely have a claim under a bond indenture, that they don't have to file claims.

THE COURT: This is a standard situation where they've been scheduled, and even if they hadn't been scheduled, you'd have a claim by the indenture trustee?

MR. KAROTKIN: Yes, sir. It does provide that the indenture trustee has the authority to file the claim, and it's not necessary for individual bondholders to file claims. It's simply based on the claim under the bond indenture. If they have other claims, obviously they --

THE COURT: Of course.

MR. KAROTKIN: -- would be required. But again, we think we've complied with the rules. We think notice is adequate. And I think that Mr. D'Apice is raising a lot of red herrings, because simply the plaintiff lawyers don't want to be bothered. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Rogoff?

MR. ROGOFF: Just briefly, Your Honor. Adam Rogoff on behalf of the committee. Briefly, Your Honor, from the committee's perspective, we look back at the interests of all the creditor groups that are out there. And one thing I note is we spent time this morning talking about the asbestos claimants. But there are also many other types of tort claimants in this case: personal injury victims --

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THE COURT: Such as somebody who's in a car wreck?

MR. ROGOFF: Exactly, Your Honor. And I'm not advocating an expansion or exclusion, to say it differently, of the bar date for those tort claimants. I'm simply pointing out that there are many other tort claimants in these cases who are required to comply with the bar date. And as a result, I don't believe that we should be picking and choosing among tort claimants to the prejudice of others, let alone to the prejudice of other unsecured creditors in these cases.

Your Honor did note that distinction at the beginning of his questioning, and I just thought it would be helpful, as we've come presumably to the conclusions of the oral arguments, just to note that that is correct. There are many other tort claimants in these cases who are going to be bound by the bar date. And that does help the estate as a whole map out the appropriate plan process for all creditors.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROGOFF: Thank you.

THE COURT: Everybody had a chance to be heard? All right, sit in place, everybody.

(Pause)

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THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, subject to some adjustments in the timing of the notice period and a few words in the notice, I'm approving the debtors' motion.

And the following are the bases for the exercise of my discretion in this regard.

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The asbestos litigants' objection, when one puts aside its hints that I should reconsider matters that I've already ruled upon, boils down to two principal points, one of which is that there should be a special rule for asbestos litigants, absolving them from the duty applicable to all other creditors in this case, to file proofs of claim, if their claims have not been previously scheduled, or where they might be represented by indenture trustees or other special representatives. And it argues that there should be special notice directed to the subset of the creditors' community which might be asserting asbestos claims.

In each case, I believe that that request is inappropriate. In my view, for the reasons that Mr. Rogoff mentioned and similar reasons that he could have mentioned if he had spoken at greater length, there should not be a special rule for asbestos litigants, especially where, as here, that raises the risk if not the certainty, of prejudice to the remainder of the creditor community, which, to the extent it matters, and frankly I think it does, is much, much larger than the subset of the creditor community that is asserting asbestos claims.

Asbestos claims -- and remember, we're talking about present claims, we're not talking about future claims -- are a species of personal injury claim. And nobody has suggested, properly in my view, that there should be a special rule for

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general tort litigants such as products liability litigants, people who are in car wrecks. And we have to keep our eye on the ball, which is to get our arms around the universe of claims. We're not going to be able to liquidate them all that quickly, of course, but we'll know what's out there, so that we can get value into the pockets of the creditors as quickly as possible.

I don't think it's either necessary or appropriate for me to prejudge how the debtor and the creditors' committee are going to be putting their noodles together to structure the liquidating plan. But it's at least conceivable, by way of example, that they might want to create a reserve to deal with claims that can't be liquidated right away and get value out to those people whose claims are fixed, so that the entirety of the creditor community doesn't have to be penalized for uncertainty.

I don't know if they'll choose that approach or not, but one thing that they need to do before they can work out the mechanics for getting value into the pockets of creditors, is to get their arms around the universe of claims. That seems to me so fundamental and so commonsense that I don't see how any reasonable person could quarrel with that.

Now, I thought that an extra couple of weeks would be in the interests of the creditor community, and that seems to have elicited no significant objection. The task, as we talked

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about in colloquy, is to balance the needs and concerns of the entirety of the creditors community in getting value out to creditors by keeping moving the case forward, against the need which we have to be careful about, which is to cut off their opportunity to file claims. And for that reason, in the exercise of my discretion, I think sixty days is better than forty-five. But I think that with that adjustment, what the debtors have proposed is appropriate. And I'm going to approve them.

Then we get to the quality of the notice and the quality of the publication. I think the debtors said that I don't need to order it because they're doing it anyway, which is actual mailed notice to all of the lawyers who have represented asbestos claimants. And I understand that to mean people who either filed suit or wrote letters or made phone calls or otherwise told the debtors that they intend to assert those claims or that they're asserting them. And to the extent they're not represented by counsel, and frankly I think the great bulk are represented by counsel, but to the extent they're not, similar notice to them.

That's going to be the legislative history of this order, Mr. Karotkin. And I don't care whether it says that you're going to do that in the order or whether you do it without me ordering it, but one way or another, I expect you to see that they get that notice that you said they would get.

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I also considered the publication that's been proposed to be satisfactory, especially since it's obvious to me that the lawyers in the asbestos claim community are more than capable of communicating with each other, and that they do that all the time.

One point that was made in the papers did hit a responsive chord with me. I'm not going to direct that the notice be rewritten, but I think that the objection that it was wordy and lawyeresque and legalesesque was well taken. I think as a matter of best practices, the debtors' community should start working on preparing its bar date notices in something closer to plain English. But I am not going to, today, order that something that would be a matter of best practices will be turned into a requirement, at least not in this case.

I will say that one of the common lawyer habits of using three words to express one, I think, because it's so important, needs to be fixed. So instead of saying that if they don't file claims they're going to be barred, estopped and enjoined, or whatever the exact words that were used in that draft notice, the notice should say that if you don't timely file your proof of claim, you're going to be barred "dash" forbidden "dash" from asserting the claim thereafter.

I don't know what estopped means in this sense. I'm not going to be sending out injunctions to a zillion people.

I'll see what the exact words were that troubled me. I think I

38 1 paraphrased them reasonably close. 2 (Pause) 3 MR. KAROTKIN: Your Honor, I believe it's in paragraph 6 of the notice. Third line? 4 THE COURT: Right you are, Mr. Karotkin. And my 5 memory of the words that had been used was pretty accurate. 6 in that paragraph 6, instead of saying "barred, estopped and 7 enjoined," I want you to say "barred - that is forbidden - from 8 asserting the claim, going on. I don't want to use three 9 words where one is sufficient, and I want it to be of a type 10 11 that a person of ordinary intelligence understands the consequence of not doing it. 12 With those adjustments, the motion is granted and the 13 notice is approved. And Mr. Karotkin, I'll leave it to you and 14 your folks to paper the ruling and implement it. 15 16 MR. KAROTKIN: Thank you, sir. THE COURT: All right, folks. I don't know if this is 17 you, Mr. Karotkin, or you, Mr. Smolinsky. I think we have a 18 19 number of other matters that are not controversial. Do you 2.0 want me to do them, or do you just want to submit orders on 21 them or how would you like me to proceed on that? MR. SMOLINSKY: Thank you, Your Honor. Joe Smolinsky. 22 23 We'd be happy to submit orders. There is one matter on the 10:30 calendar, the Environmental Testing, that I think I'd 2.4 25 like to just explain where we came out.

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THE COURT: Yes. If you don't have anybody showing up at 10:30, can we do it right now?

MR. SMOLINSKY: We certainly can, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's do it.

MR. SMOLINSKY: Your Honor, you'll recall that the subject lease was rejected earlier in these cases. ETC then filed a motion for allowance of an administrative expense and a motion for payment of an administrative expense for real estate taxes, amounts due under service contracts, and approximately 1.8 million dollars for environmental remediation and restoration of the property. The lease, when it was rejected, had about six months to run on the lease.

The debtors have been working with ETC to reconcile the claims and to try to come to grips with the different -the types of claims. And we ultimately came to resolution embodied in a stipulation. ETC is going to receive an administrative expense claim in the amount of 65,000 dollars, which will be paid within seven business days of entry of a final order. Additionally, ETC will receive an unsecured prepetition claim in the amount of 975,000 dollars, which is in full and final satisfaction of all of their remaining rejection claims and any other claims that they might have, under the lease or otherwise.

And I think, Your Honor, that that fully resolves the matter. We have a stipulation which we can hand into chambers.

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               THE COURT: Okay. That's fine, Mr. Smolinsky. And
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      why don't you or one of your folks just drop it off across the
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      hall when we're done?
               MR. SMOLINSKY: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: And actually, I think we are done now,
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      aren't we?
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               MR. SMOLINSKY: We are, Your Honor.
               THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, folks. Have a good day.
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               MR. SMOLINSKY: Thank you, Your Honor.
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           (Proceedings concluded at 9:59 a.m.)
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8	Penina Wolicki	
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